Telecare medical information systems (TMIS) allow patients remotely login medical service providers to acquire their medical information and track their health status through unsecured public networks. Hence, the privacy of patients is vulnerable to various types of security threats and attacks, such as the leakage of medical records or login footprints and the forgery attacks. Many anonymous three-factor authentication and key agreement (AKA) schemes have been proposed for TMIS with single server, but none of them is suited for TMIS with multiple servers. In this paper, we propose a biometric-based three-factor AKA scheme to protect user anonymity and untraceability in TMIS with multiple servers. We will construct a security model of a three-factor AKA scheme with user anonymity in TMIS with multiple servers, and give a formal security proof of the proposed scheme. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the elliptic curve decisional Diffie-Hellman problem assumption and hash function assumption. We will show that the proposed scheme is efficient enough for low-power mobile devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The demand for telemedicine services grows rapidly with the rise of health consciousness, the development of Internet of Things (IoT), and the dramatic growth of the world's older population. Telecare medical information systems (TMIS) allow patients to remotely login medical servers to enjoy healthcare or access medical records. How to transmit private information in public channels while keeping secrecy and patients' privacy becomes a new issue.
Numerous authentication and key agreement (AKA) schemes have been proposed from a simple password based scheme to two-factor and three-factor schemes. In 1981, Lamport [1] proposed the first password based authentication scheme. Password based authentication schemes cannot withstand the replay attacks and have to maintain the password files or verification tables; Hwang et al.'s [2] proposed the first two-factor authentication scheme in 1990 to overcome these problems. Two-factor authentication schemes verify the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zijian Zhang . user by user's password and smart card. Recently, threefactor authentication schemes get more attention because that they can prevent stolen smart card attack. Three-factor authentication schemes verify the user by a combination of three different factors: the knowledge, the possession, and the inherent categories. Many present three-factor AKA schemes verify the user by password, smart card, and biometric.
For personal privacy, patients want to access medical servers anonymously. Many anonymous AKA schemes are proposed to prevent the leakage of user's identity. In ordinary anonymous authentication schemes, even though a user uses an anonymous identity to login, the relationship between each login is exposed since the user uses identical anonymous identity in each login. Recently, the concept of untraceability has been proposed to overcome this problem, there is no identical or related information would be transmitted in different sessions.
A patient usually communicates to the same medical service provider (server) through unreliable channels in TMIS with single server. In TMIS with multiple servers, a patient communicates to various servers through unreliable channels.
The various servers can be doctors, case managers, health centers, clinics, hospitals, etc. These servers should be regards as independent entities with distinct private keys. Otherwise, the malicious server would masquerade as a patient or another medical server.
Many anonymous three-factor AKA schemes have been proposed for TMIS with single server. In 2013, Das and Goswami [3] proposed an anonymity preserving AKA scheme for connected health care. Later on, Wen [4] pointed out the security defects of Das-Goswami scheme, such as user impersonation attack and without user anonymity, and proposed an improvement. In 2014, Xie et al. [5] showed that Wen's scheme [4] is vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack and without user anonymity. In 2015, Xu and Wu [6] showed that Xie et al.'s scheme [5] is vulnerable to the De-synchronization attack. In 2014, Tan [7] proposed a three-factor AKA scheme for single server TMIS. Later on, Arshad and Nikooghadam [8] pointed out that Tan's scheme [7] is vulnerable to replay attacks. In 2015, Das [9] and Lu et al. [10] showed that Arshad-Nikooghadam scheme [8] cannot withstand offline password guessing and user impersonation attacks, and proposed improvements. Later, Amin et al. [11] and Jiang et al. [12] demonstrated that Lu et al.'s scheme [10] is insecure against user anonymity, new smart card issue, patient impersonation, and medical server impersonation attacks; they both proposed an improvement. In 2014, Mishra et al. [13] improved an un-anonymous biometrics based AKA scheme [14] to achieve user anonymity. In 2015, Amin and Biswas [15] showed that the Mishra et al.'s protocol [13] cannot withstand server impersonation, session key computation, and smart card stolen attacks, and proposed an improvement. However, in 2016, Wazid et al. [16] showed that Amin et al.'s scheme [11] is vulnerable to privileged insider attack through both smart card stolen and offline password guessing attacks, and also showed that Amin-Biswas's scheme [15] is vulnerable to privileged-insider, stolen smart card, and offline password guessing, user impersonation as well as strong replay attacks. In 2016, Jiang et al. [17] proposed a privacy preserving three-factor AKA scheme for e-Health clouds. However, Irshad and Chaudhry [18] identified a flaw in the mutual authentication phase of Jiang et al.'s scheme [17] that an adversary may launch a denial-of-service attack (DoS) against the server. In 2017, Zhang et al. [19] proposed a privacy protection for TMIS using a chaotic mapbased three-factor AKA scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no anonymous three-factor AKA scheme proposed for TMIS with multiple servers. Recently, some anonymous three-factor AKA schemes have been proposed for multi-server environment. Although they are not specifically designed for TMIS, they are suitable for TMIS with multiple servers. Let us discuss these schemes in the following.
In 2015, Lu et al. [20] proposed a biometrics and smart cards-based authentication scheme for multi-server environments that provides strong user anonymity. However, Chaudhry et al.'s [21] pointed out that Lu et al.'s scheme [20] is defenseless against user impersonation attack, and proposed an improvement. In the same year, He and Wang [22] proposed a biometrics-based AKA scheme for multiserver environment with strong user anonymity. However, Odelu et al. [23] showed that He-Wang scheme fails to prevent known session temporary information attack, and their scheme cannot prevent the reply attack and impersonation attack; they further proposed an improvement.
Also in 2015, Amin and Biswas [24] found that Hsieh and Leu's two-factor authentication scheme [25] is vulnerable to user anonymity, password guessing, and server masquerading attacks, and the password change phase is inefficient; they modified it to be a three-factor authentication scheme. In 2017, Chandrakar and Om [26] showed that Amin-Biswas scheme [24] cannot prevent identity and password guessing, user untraceability, user-server impersonation, and privileged insider attacks. They further proposed an improvement. However, Chuang and Lei [27] found that Chandrakar-Om scheme [26] is vulnerable to malignant server attack; any user who has ever login a server, the server would get the user's secrets to impersonate the user. In the same year, Chandrakar and Om [28] proposed another anonymous three-factor remote authentication scheme for multi-server environment using ECC. Unfortunately, Chuang and Lei [27] showed that Chandrakar-Om scheme [28] is vulnerable to insider attack; any user can impersonate another user.
In 2016, Park and Park [29] pointed out that a two-factor authentication scheme proposed by Chang et al. [30] is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks, and further proposed a three-factor authentication using elliptic curve cryptosystem, and proposed an improvement. However, the Gateway node (registration center) needs to store and manage user's temporal identity table in Park-Park scheme [29] . Also in 2016, Irshad et al. [31] proposed an anonymous multi-server authenticated key agreement based on chaotic map without engaging registration center, which the servers have to store public keys of all users. In 2017, Amin et al. [32] proposed an anonymous multi-server authentication protocol using multiple registration servers. Their scheme uses the unique identity to achieve user anonymity, but the unique identity repeats in each login session that their scheme does not achieve user untraceability. Also in 2017, Reddy et al. [33] proposed an AKA for multi-server environment. In 2019, Xu et al. [34] indicated that Reddy et al.'s scheme [33] lacks untraceability for users and is susceptible to privileged insider attacks, and proposed an improvement. In 2018, Qi et al. [35] proposed a secure biometrics-based AKA protocol for multi-server TMIS using ECC; however, the management of server's public keys is an issue.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we proposed a secure three-factor AKA scheme for a TMIS with multiple servers, which achieves user anonymity and untraceability; meanwhile, no public keys and password tables need to be maintained. We add on-line update phase to avoid the involvement of the registration center in each mutual authentication phase.
We construct a security model of a three-factor AKA scheme with user anonymity in TMIS with multiple servers, and give a formal security proof of the proposed scheme. We also show that the proposed scheme is efficient enough for low-power mobile devices.
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of user anonymity: weak anonymity and strong anonymity. Weak anonymity: Protect the real identities of users from outsiders; only the participants in the session can get the real identity of the user. In some situations, the servers (medical service providers) need to obtain user's real identity in TMIS to provide medical service, such as tracking and retrieval of health records; an AKA scheme with weak anonymity is suitable for this kind of situation. Strong anonymity: It not only achieves the weak anonymity, but also protects the real identities of users from the logged-in servers. In our scheme, if a user wants to protect his/her real identity from the logged-in servers, then he/she can use a pseudonym as his/her identity in the registration phase to achieve strong anonymity.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The preliminaries are elaborated in Section II. In Section III, we will introduce the framework and the threat model of TMIS with multiple servers and construct a security model of a threefactor remote AKA with user anonymity in TMIS with multiple servers. The proposed scheme and the formal proof are presented in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Section VI shows the performance analysis and comparison. We draw the conclusion and the future work in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the elliptic curve group [36] - [38] , fuzzy extractor [39] , and the underlying hard mathematical problems [38] .
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Let p be a prime number, and let F p denotes the field of integers modulo p. An elliptic curve E over F p is defined by an equation of the form
The set of all the points on E is denoted by E(F p ). Let P be a point in E(F p ), and suppose that P has prime order n. Then the cyclic subgroup of E(F p ) generated by P is G = {∞, P, 2P, 3P, . . . , (n − 1)P}.
Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field F p , there are three hard mathematical problems [38] :
1) Elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) problem:
Given a point Q=dP∈ G, determine the integer d.
2) Elliptic curve decisional Diffie-Hellman (ECDDH)
problem: Given a point P ∈ E(F p ) of order n, and points A = aP, B = bP, and C = cP in G =< P >, determine whether C = abP or, equivalently, whether c ≡ ab (mod n).
3) Elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman (ECCDH)
problem: Given a point P ∈ E(F p ) of order n, and points A = aP, B = bP ∈ G, find the point C = abP.
B. FUZZY EXTRACTOR
Many biometric based authentication schemes refer to Dodis et al.'s article [39] ; readers may refer to it for the details. We briefly describe the definition of generate function Gen and reproduce function Rep in the following. 
C. MATHMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The security of the proposed scheme is based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (ECDDH Assumption): No polynomial-time algorithm can solve the Elliptic curve decisional Diffie-Hellman (ECDDH) problem with non-negligible advantage. Assumption 2 (Hash Function Assumption):
There exists a secure one-way hash function H:X = {0,1} * → Y = Z * p , which satisfies the following requirements: 1) Preimage Resistance: Given any y ∈ Y, it is hard to find
x ∈ X such that H(x) = y.
2) Second Preimage Resistance: Given any x∈X, it is hard to find x'∈X such that x' =x and H(x') = H(x). 3) Collision Resistance: It is hard to find x, x'∈X such that x' =x and H(x') = H(x).

D. NOTATIONS
The notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 1 .
III. FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY
We introduce the TMIS and construct a security model of anonymous three-factor AKA for TMIS with multiple servers. 
A. FRAMWORK OF TMIS
In a TMIS with multiple servers, there are one trusted registration center (RC), various medical service providers (Servers), and numerous patients (Users). RC is in charge of system setup, the registration affairs, and keeping the secret key of the system. Servers may be doctors, case managers, clinics, hospitals, health centers, and so on. To protect the privacy of users, servers are regarded as independent entities with distinct private keys. Any server cannot compromise the secrecy of the session between a user and another server. Each user has a low-power mobile device to communicate to servers. Initially, RC established the system. Each server and user must be registered on the RC through a secure channel when joining the system, and the RC will generate its private key and send it back through a secure channel. After registration, each user makes on-line update through a public channel to get the necessary information before he/she logs into an unfamiliar server. Then, users can use his/her private key and the necessary information to log into servers remotely, authenticate mutually and establish common session keys for secure communication in public channels. Figure 1 illustrates the framework of the TMIS.
B. THREAT MODEL
The following are the assumptions about the attacker's capabilities. CA1. A legitimate user and a legitimate server can behave as an attacker. CA2. An attacker can eavesdrop, replay, insert, delete, or modify any message over an unreliable channel. CA3. An attacker can offline enumerate all the (ID, PW) pairs in the Cartesian product D ID × D PW within polynomial time [40] . CA4. An attacker can steal the user's smart card and extract the secret data from it using the power consumption analysis [41] , [42] . CA5. An attacker might fake the biometric [43] .
CA6. An attacker can successfully guess the password, extract the secret data from smart card, and fake the biometric individually, but break them at the same time is not feasible in polynomial time.
C. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
According to the thereat model, we define the adversarial model of anonymous three-factor remote AKA in TMIS with multiple servers. In the adversarial model, the TMIS environment contains three kinds of participants: a trusted RC, n users U ={U i | for i = 1 ,. . . ,n}, and k servers S = {S j | for j = 1 ,. . . , k}. Each user U i and each server S j have unique identities ID Ui and ID Sj , respectively. Let s α denote the s-th instance of the participant α ∈ U ∪ S. We assume that an adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm and potentially control all communications by accessing to a set of oracles described below. An adversary can send eight kinds of queries: Hash, Extract, Send, Execute, Reveal, Rot, Corrupt, and Test queries. In the adversarial model, there is a Simulator B (oracles) who responds to queries of an adversary as below.
• Hash (m): B keeps an initially empty list for each hash function. When receiving the hash query along with a message m, the same response is returned if the query has been asked before. Otherwise, B selects a random value r, records the pair (m, r), and returns r to A. 
D. DEFINITIONS OF SECUTIRY
To demonstrate the security of the ID-based MAKA scheme for multi-server environment, we give definitions of security in this subsection. Let s α denote the s-th instance of the participant αin the adversarial model. 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
Our scheme is composed of five phases: the setup phase, the registration phase, the on-line update phase, the login and AKA phase, and the password and biometric change phase. 
B. REGISTRATION PHASE 1) SERVER REGISTRATION PHASE
When a new server S j is to be registered, the following steps are performed.
Step 1: S j freely chooses an identity ID Sj , and sends it to RC through a secure channel.
Step 2: After receiving ID Sj from the server, RC computes k Sj = h(ID Sj ||x), and sends {k Sj , Pub} to S j through a secure channel.
2) USER REGISTRATION PHASE
When a patient U i wants to be a legal user in TMIS, he/she performs the following steps with RC through a secure channel, as shown in Figure 2 .
Step 1: U i freely chooses an identity ID Ui and a password PW i . Note that ID Ui can be either the real identity of U i or just a pseudonym to achieve strong anonymity. U i then imprints the biometric B i via a sensor and uses Gen function on B i to produce the private key SP i and the public key PP i , i.e., (SP i , PP i ) = Gen(B i ). U i computes RPW i = h(PW i ||SP i ) and sends < ID Ui , RPW i > to RC through a secure channel.
Step 2: After receiving a request message from the user, RC
into a smart card, and sent it to U i through a secure channel.
Step 3: After receiving the smart card from RC, the user stores PP i into the smart card. Finally, the smart card contains {PP i , a i , c i , Pub}.
C. ON-LINE UPDATE PHASE
Before the user U i logs into an unfamiliar server S j , he/she has to run the on-line update phase once to get the public key PK j of S j , and the common secret key C ij between U i and S j . U i can delete <ID Sj , PK j , C ij >, which are stored in the smart card, at any time after the on-line update phase. But after then, U i has to execute the on-line update phase again to get <ID Sj , PK j , C ij > before U i logs into server S j . U i can ask a batch of on-line update phase for different servers, and can ask for the same server more than once. The on-line update phase is illustrated in Figure 3 and performed as following steps:
Step 1: U i inputs identity ID Ui and password PW i to the smart card and imprints the biometric impression B i at the sensor. U i 's smart card produces the private key SP * i by executing Rep function on B i and PP i , i.e., SP
, and checks if c * i = c i . If so, the validity of U i is confirmed, and then continues the procedure. Otherwise, U i 's smart card terminates it.
Step 2: U i 's smart card generates a random nonce n ∈ Z * p and computes N = n·P, K = n·X, and DID = ID Ui ⊕ K . U i then sends <DID, ID Sj , N > to RC through an untrustworthy channel.
Step 3: After receiving a request message from the user, RC computes K = x·N, ID * Ui = DID⊕K , k Ui = h(ID * Ui ||x), k Sj = h(ID Sj ||x), PK j = k Sj · P, and C ij = (k −1 Ui · h(k Sj ||ID * Ui ))·P. Finally, RC computes v = h(ID * Ui ||k Ui || PK j ||C ij ||K ), and sends <PK j , C ij , v > to U i through an untrustworthy channel.
Step 4: U i 's smart card computes k Ui = a i ⊕ d * i and v * = h(ID * Ui ||k Ui ||PK j ||C ij ||K), and checks if v * = v. If so, stores <ID Sj , PK j , C ij > into the smart card.
D. LOGIN AND AKA PHASE
When a user U i wants to log into a server S j , the following steps are performed. Figure 4 illustrates the login and AKA phase.
Step 1: Same as Step 1 in the on-line update phase.
Step 2: U i generates a random nonce n U and timestamp T U , and then computes N U = n U ·P, and k Ui = a i ⊕d * i .U i finds PK j and C ij corresponding to S j 's identity ID Sj in the smart card, and computes Q U _ 1 = n U ·PK j ,
Step 3: When the server S j receives the login request message from U i , S j generates a timestamp T S , and verifies if T S − T U ≤ T . If not, rejects the login request; otherwise, continues the process.
If not, rejects the login request; otherwise, continues the process. S j generates a random nonce n S in Z * p and computes N S = n S · P, the common session key SK ij = h(Q U _ 1 ||Q U _ 2 ||N S ), and v S = h(ID * Ui ||ID Sj || SK ij ||T U ||T S ). S j then sends < N S , T S ,v S > to U i .
Step 4: After receiving < N S ,T S , v S >, U i generates a timestamp T U , and verifies if T U -T S ≤ T . If not, rejects the login request; otherwise, continues the process. 
E. PASSWORD AND BIOMETRIC CHANGE PHASE
When a user U i wants to change the password or biometric impression, U i can change them on his/her own by performing the following steps.
Step 2: U i inputs the new password PW new i , and imprints new biometric impression
). U i 's smart card then replaces a i , c i , and PP i with a new i , c new i , and PP new i , respectively.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed scheme in the random oracle model [44] . The random oracle model assumes that the hash function is actually a true random function and it produces a random value for each new query. In the random oracle model, the security of the proposed scheme is based on the ECDDH problem. We formally prove that the proposed scheme offers unforgeability, session key secrecy, and full forward secrecy, and provides user anonymity. Theorem 1: The proposed scheme offers existential unforgeability, session key secrecy and full forward secrecy against adaptive chosen ID attacks under ECDDH assumption and hash function assumption.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A who can break the unforgeability or session key secrecy or full forward secrecy of the proposed scheme with non-negligible advantage ε, running time T , and given ID U and ID S . Then we can construct an algorithm B to solve ECDDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Let q U and q S denotes the numbers of users and servers, respectively. B is given an instance (p, E p , P, A = aP, B = bP, and C = cP) of the ECDDH problem. Then B's goal is to determine whether C = abP. B runs A as a subroutine and simulates its attack environment. First, B chooses x and sets the public system parameters Pub = {X , h(), Gen(),Rep(), p, E p , P, T } by letting X = xP. B permeates the ECDDH problem into the queries on user U (ID U ) and server S (ID S ), which are asked by A. B lets k −1 U · P = A and h(k V ||ID U ) · P = B. Without loss of generality, assume that A does not ask queries on the same message more than once, and the user instance If ID α = ID U , then B computes PK β = k β · P, and C αβ = (k −1 α · h(k β ||ID α ))·P. B then makes Hash(ID α ||k α ||PK β ||C αβ ||K) query to get v and returns <PK β ,C αβ , v > to A. Start) : B generates a random nonce n α and timestamp T α , and then makes Hash(ID β ||x) query to get k β , and Hash(k β ||ID α ) query to get h(k β ||ID α ).If ID α = ID U and ID β = ID S , B then lets Q α _ 2 = n α · B; otherwise, B computes N α = n α · P and Q α _ 2 
generates a random nonce n β and a timestamp T β , and verifies if T β − T α ≤ T . If not, B returns ''Reject''. B makes Hash(ID β ||x) query to get k β , and computes N β = n β · P, query, then B answers C = abP to the ECDDH problem. The success probability of B depends on the event that A asks the Test SK query on user U (ID U ) and server S (ID S ) and correctly guesses b in the Test SK query. In the above simulation, the probability that A asks the Test SK query in the l-th session is 1/q U · q S . If A correctly guesses b in the Test SK query with a non-negligible advantage ε, then B solves the ECDDH problem with a non-negligible advantage ε/q U · q S . By Assumption 1, no polynomial-time algorithm can solve ECDDH problem with non-negligible advantage, it is a contradiction. Hence, there is no PPT time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the above game played between A and B. Then by Definition 5, the proposed scheme offers existential unforgeability, session key secrecy and full forward secrecy against adaptive chosen ID attacks.
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme maintains user anonymity under ECDDH and hash function assumptions.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A who can break the anonymity of the proposed scheme with running time T , advantage ε. Then we can construct an algorithm B to solve ECDDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Let q U , q S , and q ns , respectively, denote the numbers of users, servers, and sessions. B is given an instance (p, E p , P, A = aP, B = bP, and C = cP) of the elliptic curve decision Diffie-Hellman problem. Then B's goal is to determine whether C = abP. B runs A as a subroutine and simulates its attack environment. First, B chooses x and sets the public system parameters Pub = {X , h(), Gen(),Rep(), p, E p , P, T } by letting X = x·P. B gives the public parameters to A. B permeates ECDDH problem into the queries, which are asked by A in the l-session, on user U (ID U ) and server S (ID S ). Without loss of generality, assume that A does not ask queries on the same message more than once, and the user instance -Send update ( s α , <DID, ID β , N >): When A asks this query, B computes K=x·N and ID α = DID⊕K , and makes Hash(ID α ||x) query to get k α . B makes Hash(ID β ||x) query to get k β , and computes PK β = k β · P, and C αβ = (k −1 α · h(k β ||ID α ))·P. If ID α = ID U and ID β = ID S , then B lets PK β = PK S = B. B then makes Hash(ID α ||k α ||PK β ||C αβ ||K) query to get v and returns <PK β ,C αβ , v > to A.
• Test ID ( s α ): When A makes a Test query, B randomly chooses a bit b ∈{0,1}. B then returns ID α if b = 1, and else returns a random number. If A answers b = 1 to the Test ID query, then B answers C = abP to the ECDDH problem. If A answers b =1 to the Test ID query, then B answers C = abP to the ECDDH problem. The success probability of B depends on the event that A asks the Test ID query for the user U (ID U ) and the server S (ID S ) in the l-session. In the above simulation, the probability that A asks the Test ID query for ID U is 1/q U , and asks the Send query for ID S in the l-session is 1/q S·q ns . If A correctly guesses b in the Test ID query with non-negligible advantage ε, then B solves mECCDH problem with non-negligible advantage at least ε/q U · q S · q ns . By Assumption 1, no polynomial-time algorithm can solve ECDDH problem with non-negligible advantage, it is a contradiction. Hence, there is no PPT time adversary A has a nonnegligible advantage in the above game played between A and B. Then by Definition 5, the proposed scheme offers existential user anonymity against adaptive chosen ID attacks.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
Vliegen et al. [45] described the implementation of elliptic curve cryptography over prime fields on the Xilinx VirtexII-Pro XC2VP30 FPGA device with maximal clock frequency 25.51 MHz, the execution times of TG mul , T inv , TG add , and T mul are 17.71 milliseconds (ms), 1.24 ms, 0.06276 ms, 0.00286 ms, respectively. In [46] , the execution time of a hash function is 0.065 ms, in which the implementation is performed on the MSP430 family with a frequency of 8 MHz. The execution times of operations are summarized in Table 2 . Table 3 shows the estimated executing times on the user side. In our scheme, the estimated execution time of a user during registration phase, on-line update phase, and login and AKA phase are only 0.065 ms, 35.68 ms, and 53.52286 ms, respectively. Obviously, our scheme is well suited for the lowpower mobile devices.
The comparisons of our scheme and the relevant threefactor AKA schemes, which are suitable for TMIS with multiple servers, are summarized in Table 4 . These schemes all achieve both user anonymity and untraceability except Amin et al.'s [32] [35] scheme, there are public keys need to be managed and public. Verifying the authenticity of public keys is an issue.
Only our scheme, the registration center does not need to maintain any table, and is not involved in the user login and MAKA phases; meanwhile, no public key needs to be managed. Moreover, our scheme keeps the efficiency and is suitable for low power devices.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a biometric based three-factor AKA scheme that is suited for TMIS with multiple servers, and achieves strong user anonymity and user untraceability. We constructed a security model of a three-factor AKA scheme with user anonymity for TMIS with multiple servers. We gave the formal proof of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model, and the security of the proposed scheme is based on the ECDDH and hash function assumptions. We estimated the executing times on low-power mobile devices to show that our scheme is efficient enough. Moreover, we compared our scheme with relevant three-factor AKA schemes to show the contributions of our scheme.
In the proposed scheme, a user needs to run the on-line update phase once before he/she logs into an unfamiliar server. Our future work is to modify the proposed scheme to be free from on-line update; meanwhile, retain all advantages.
